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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 66 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 17/06/1996 
Where it occurred: Quessua, Malange Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 18/06/1996 
ID original source: EB/IG/PC Name of source: CMAO 
Organisation: [Name removed]  





Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 3 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR 415538 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Lombe Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet: 113 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
1 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group were using a two-man drill at the site. In this, one deminer uses the 
detector to locate and mark metallic readings while the other checks for tripwires, cuts 
undergrowth and excavates any detector readings. It is not known whether the group ran 
three-man teams with the two-man drill. 
No Board of Inquiry report was available at the Angola MAC in December 1998. A report of 
the UN investigation made on the day following the accident was made available by one of its 
authors in July 1999. The following summarises its content.  
The accident site was described as a "wide undulating grassy area" that was part of an 
agricultural complex. Grass was about 2m (6') high with small bush and trees scattered 
irregularly. The mines were used as part of a defensive position facing a wide open area. The 
survey had revealed a "horseshoe" deployment of POMZ, OZM-72, PMN and MAI-75 mines. 
The mines found prior to the accident were OZM-72s and PMNs. The demining team was the 
second to have been trained under the UN backed training initiative. It had completed school 
training on 29th March 1996 and moved to continue training under field conditions. They were 
first deployed on 25th April 1996 and started work at the accident area on 29th May 1996. 
Prior to the accident a two-man team including Victim No.3 were clearing a one metre wide 
lane. They were wearing frag-jackets, helmets and visors. The Team supervisor (a 
Uruguayan National) was not wearing protective clothing. He became Victim No.1. Another 
ex-pat supervisor (Pakistani National) on site was wearing a helmet and visor. He became 
Victim No.2. The deminers could see a partly exposed PMN about two metres in front of the 
end-of-lane marker stick. 
The detector man used his detector and got a continuous reading over a wide area. Victim 
No.1 came to his assistance and tried the detector with similar results [the detector type was 
not recorded but is believed to have been the Schiebel AN/19 because the group used that 
model later].  
In his role as Team Supervisor, Victim No.1 sent the detector man back down the lane about 
ten metres to tune the detector. Victim No.2 walked past the detector man and went to join 
Victim No.1 at the end of the lane. The two Supervisors knelt at the end of the lane and 
prodded around the partly exposed mine [if it was two metres ahead of the end-of-lane 
marker they must have moved into the uncleared area to do this]. 
Victim No.3 moved forward to join them and stood directly behind them. At that time Victim 
No.1 had the PMN in his hand and was standing in front of the end-of-lane marker stick. He 
was "attempting to carry out the disarming drill". The three victims were within "three to four 
metres of each other" with Victim No.3 behind and apart. Victim No.3 was looking down at the 
time, with his visor down.  
At that time Victim No.1 initiated a second PMN by standing on it. He suffered a below knee 
amputation of his right leg. Victim No.2 alongside and on his left was also "severely" injured in 
one leg. Both were knocked over by the accident. Victim No.3 was standing [and apparently 
confused]. The mine that Victim No.1 was holding had fallen to the ground but did not 
detonate. 
Several deminers came to assist and Victim No.1 told them not to move him until the 
stretchers arrived. Victims No.1 and 2 were taken to the ambulance on stretchers where the 
four medics on site treated them. They had no pain-killing drugs. A Ukrainian doctor arrived at 
the site some time later [not recorded how long] and administered morphine. Victim No.3's 
minor injuries were treated at the scene [it was not recorded when]. Victim's No. 1 and 2 were 
taken in one ambulance to Malange hospital and Victim No.3 followed later in the Ukrainian 
doctor's ambulance. 
Victim No.1's right leg was amputated below the knee and he was given a transfusion of 
blood donated by a deminer and medic. Then Victims No 1 and 2 were flown to hospital in 
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South Africa [possibly via Luanda]. It was not recorded what treatment Victim No.3 received 
for his "fragmentation injuries". 
The investigators found the site laid out "similar" to requirements. They found parts of a PMN 
"striker mechanism" in the crater at the site. Victim No.1's spectacles, a prodder and the mine 
he had dropped were also lying in front of the end-of-lane marker. They stated that "the initial 
reports received… were inaccurate" [no record of them were found]. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that SOPs were not followed. [The retrieval of the mine for 
disarming was possibly excused by a shortage of demolition explosives requiring that TNT be 
recycled but the TNT in a PMN is cast into it and impossible to remove in one piece.] They 
stated that SOPs must be followed "unless there are strong grounds for any variation". Any 
change to SOPs that might become "normal practice" should become formal amendments to 
SOPs. They further concluded that all visitors and supervisors should wear safety spectacles, 
and that not more than one Supervisor should be in a lane at one time. They added 
[enigmatically] that vehicle keys should be left in the ignition, [which implies that some 
problems were encountered when the urgent need to move vehicles became apparent]. 
The investigators also found that the medical equipment provided was "inadequate" and that 
the absence of field to base communications had led to the most senior person at the site 
being absent (having travelled to Luanda to report).  
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that a communications system linking field operations with 
the base should be put into place  "as soon as possible" and that team member(s) other than 
the Supervisor should be trained to use it. They also recommended that interpreters should 
be given "formal communications and driver training" and that international staff should be 
aware of their blood groups and arrange a donor "buddy" system when possible. They added 
that, within the constraints of their equipment, the paramedics performed well and should be 
commended.  
Also, the supply of explosives to demining groups "must be expedited". Then "there will be no 
temptation to defuse mines in order to utilise the explosive in them for other purposes". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 93 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 




Victim number: 94 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: none 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 95 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not appropriate 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. The victim suffered "minor fragmentation". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the victims were senior advisors to the national demining efforts and breached numerous 
safety and procedural SOPs without good reason.  
The victims were, effectively, the "Field control" and they acted improperly by moving ahead 
of the end-of-lane marker to retrieve a visible mine, by ignoring safety distances and by not 
wearing safety equipment. This implies either ignorance or contempt for the SOPs. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
 
Related papers  
No other documents were made available. Although photographs and video were referenced 
in the Accident report, only the written matter was available.  
The 240g TNT High Explosive in a PMN is poured into the mine and adheres to the 
mouldings. This makes it impossible to remove in a useful form. As a result, the disarming of 
the mine for later use as a demolition charge would require the whole mine to be used as that 
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charge. It seems likely that the mine was being collected as a souvenir, a common practice 
among some ex-pat advisors in many theatres. 
 
The picture shows a PMN with the top removed. The HE charge is coated with a black 
lacquer. 
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